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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine whether the theory of the child quantity-quality (CQQ) trade-
off developed by Becker and Lewis (1973) is borne out by the data from a developing country. In brief, 
the theory states that households behave differently with respect to their mixture of child quantity 
and child quality depending on their standards of living (i.e. low-income households tend to choose 
child quantity at the expense of child quality, and the converse is true for high-income households). If 
the government provides enough support for education, however, this trade-off might be undermined. 
Using a sample of 885 children from a survey of 2,500 households in rural areas in Terengganu in 
2009, we conducted an empirical analysis on the relationship between child quantity and child quality. 
In the baseline estimation as well as in a series of robustness check, our key findings are that there is 
a positive yet insignificant impact of child quantity on child quality. Accordingly, we take these results 
as mild evidence against the CQQ trade-off which, in turn, can be attributed to the magnitude of the 
public provision of education in Malaysia.
Keywords: Child quantity, child quality, CQQ trade-off, public provision of education.
Abstrak
Objektif makalah ini ialah untuk mengkaji sama ada teori timbal balik antara kuantiti anak 
dengan kualiti anak (CQQ) yang diketengahkan oleh Becker dan Lewis (1973) disokong oleh data 
daripada sebuah negara membangun. Secara ringkasnya, teori ini menyatakan bahawa gelagat 
isi rumah adalah berbeza dari segi kombinasi kuantiti anak dan kualiti anak bergantung kepada 
taraf hidup mereka (isi rumah berpendapatan rendah lebih cenderung kepada anak yang ramai 
berbanding kualiti manakala isi rumah berpendapatan tinggi lebih gemar kepada anak yang 
berkualiti berbanding jumlah). Namun begitu, jika kerajaan memberikan sokongan yang mencukupi 
dalam bidang pendidikan, timbal balik ini mungkin menjadi lemah. Dengan menggunakan 
sampel 885 anak-anak daripada satu kajian terhadap 2,500 isi rumah di kawasan pedalaman 
di Terengganu pada tahun 2009, penyelidik menjalankan satu kajian empirik tentang hubungan 
antara kuantiti anak dan kualiti anak. Dalam penganggaran asas dan lanjutan, dapatan utama 
kajian ini ialah kuantiti anak mempunyai kesan positif tetapi tidak signifikan terhadap kualiti 
anak. Oleh itu, penyelidik menginterpretasikan dapatan kajian ini sebagai bukti yang agak lemah 
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Introduction
Human capital is vital in promoting economic 
growth and development of a country. This is 
because human capital, defined as knowledge 
and skills embodied in persons, enables workers 
to be more productive and innovative, both of 
which serve as basic ingredients of economic 
growth. Accordingly, it is imperative that a 
country’s development policy include human 
capital accumulation as one of its main agenda. 
In this respect, it appears that the decision 
of households with regard to fertility has an 
important consequence on the future stock of 
human capital of a nation. Specifically, if a 
household chooses to have many children, then 
the children tend to be relatively uneducated. 
Conversely, if a household chooses to have few 
children, then the children tend to be relatively 
educated. As a consequence, a society which is 
characterized by a disproportionately huge share 
of large families is expected to produce a greater 
stock of future human capital than a society 
characterized by a greater share of large families. 
What could have accounted for the discrepancy 
in the behaviour of these households?
In a pioneering work, Becker and Lewis (1973) 
hypothesize that the trade-off between child 
quantity and child quality is dictated by the 
level of household income. In particular, low-
income households tend to have relatively 
many, yet uneducated children while high-
income households tend to have relatively few, 
yet educated children. In order to explain why 
changes in household income generate the trade-
off, Becker and Lewis (1973) offer three key 
propositions. First, the marginal cost of child 
quantity (i.e. the additional cost associated with 
raising one more child) is an increasing function 
of child quality.1 Second, the marginal cost of 
terhadap penolakan teori timbal balik CQQ. Penolakan teori ini mungkin boleh dikaitkan dengan 
tahap sumbangan awam yang besar dalam bidang pendidikan.
Kata kunci: Kuantiti anak, kualiti anak, timbal balik CQQ, sumbangan awam pendidikan.
child quality (i.e. the additional cost associated 
with upgrading the existing children’s education) 
is an increasing function of child quantity.2 Third, 
provided that the demand for each child quantity 
and child quality is an increasing function of 
household income, the income elasticity of 
demand for child quality is much larger than the 
income elasticity of demand for child quantity.3,4 
This means that households tend to respond more 
positively to child quality than child quantity as 
their incomes rise. 
For simplicity, assume that the income elasticity 
of demand for child quality is positive while the 
income elasticity of demand for child quantity 
is zero. Then, an increase in household income 
is expected to raise child quality while leaving 
child quantity unchanged. The increase in child 
quality is then expected to raise the marginal cost 
of child quantity (since the marginal cost of child 
quantity is a positive function of child quality), 
which leads to a decrease in child quantity 
(since its marginal cost has risen), which leads 
to a decrease in the marginal cost of child quality 
(since the marginal cost of child quality is a 
positive function of child quality), which leads 
to a subsequent increase in child quality (since 
its marginal cost has fallen), and the process 
continues. The net effect of a rise in household 
income is to increase child quality and decrease 
child quantity; hence, the CQQ trade-off.
Following Becker and Lewis (1973), numerous 
empirical studies have been conducted to 
investigate whether child quantity exerts a 
negative impact on child quality. In most of these 
early studies, however, it was found that child 
quantity has a negative effect on child quality, 
thus lending support to the theory [see Blake 
(1989) for a survey of these studies]. In recent 
years, however, some influential studies such 
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as Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) and 
Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser (2010) have found 
that there is lack of evidence of the CQQ trade-
off. The discrepancy between these findings, 
some argue, could be attributed to the problem of 
endogeneity. In particular, the older studies treat 
child quantity as an exogenous variable whereas 
the newer studies treat child quantity as an 
endogenous variable. [An important exception 
is an early study by Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(1980).] From the theoretical point of view, 
child quantity is an endogenous variable since 
households choose both the quantity and quality 
of their children. As such, the results of these 
newer studies should be given more weight. 
In another recent study, however, Li, Zhang 
and Zhu (2008) found that there is a trade-off 
even after tackling the problem of endogeneity. 
According to these scholars, the discrepancy 
between their results and those of Black, et 
al. (2005) and Angrist, et al. (2010) could be 
attributed to the extent of public provision of 
education. In the case of China, they argue, there 
is a poor provision of public education, thus 
parents have to bear the bulk of their children’s 
education costs. Consequently, the CQQ trade-
off is dominant in the case of China. In light of 
this argument, this paper revisits the issue by 
specifically examining whether Li et al. (2008)’s 
argument holds in the case of Malaysia. Since 
education is highly subsidized in Malaysia, we 
expect little or no CQQ trade-off in the country. 
Model Specification
Following the literature, we specify child quality 
(measured by child’s educational attainment) as a 
function of child quantity (or fertility) and a host 
of household characteristics as control variables. 
In view of its endogeneity, child quantity needs to 
be instrumented by an appropriate instrumental 
variable. A natural candidate for the instrument, 
as suggested by the empirical literature, is some 
exogenous variation in fertility (i.e. a variation 
in fertility that is exogenous to the choice of 
child quality but is correlated with the choice 
of child quantity). Hitherto, two frequently 
used exogenous variations in fertility are the 
occurrence of twins (defined as a dummy variable 
which is equal to 1 if the nth birth is a twin and 
0 otherwise) and gender sameness (defined as a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the first nth 
children are of the same gender and 0 otherwise). 
The basis for their choice is two-fold. First, it 
is plausible to assume (and even confirm) that 
each of the candidate instruments is correlated 
with child quantity. Second, it is reasonable to 
argue that each of the candidate instruments is 
uncorrelated with child quality (except through 
child quantity) since it is unlikely that parents 
would underinvest in the education of their 
children simply because they are endowed with 
twin children or children of the same gender.
In the studies conducted by Black et al. (2005) 
and Li, et al. (2008), twins have been employed 
as the instrument. It is imperative therefore, that 
the present study employ the same variable. 
Since data on twins are not available in our data 
set, this study opts for gender sameness as the 
instrument for child quantity. This variable has 
been employed by Angrist and Evans (1988) 
and Conley and Glauber (2006), among others. 
Accordingly, our model can be specified as 
follows:
                                                           (1)
                                                     (2)
where Educi is child i’s educational attainment 
(measured by the number of years of schooling), 
Kids is child quantity (i.e. the total number of 
children in a household), Sameness is a dummy 
variable for gender sameness (which is equal to 
1 if the first two children are of the same gender 
and 0 otherwise), and x is a vector of control 
variables which include a child’s characteristics 
(i.e. gender, birth order, and age) and parents’ 
characteristics (i.e. parents’ age and parents’ 
education).
A priori, we expect the coefficient of Kids to 
be negative to reflect the adverse relationship 
between child quantity and child quality. In 
contrast, we expect the coefficient of Sameness 
to be positive to reflect parents’ preferences for 
children of mixed gender.
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Data
The data in this study are obtained from an 
interview-based survey conducted on a sample 
of 2,500 rural households in Terengganu, 
Malaysia, in May 2009. Since the rural region 
of Terengganu is predominantly occupied by 
Malays, it is hardly surprising that all of the 
interviewed households are Malays. Since 
the unit of analysis is children (instead of 
households), we extracted the children data from 
these households. From the 2,500 households, 
the total number of children was 12,321 persons. 
This means that, on average, there are about five 
children per household. 
One of the remarkable features of the empirical 
work on the CQQ trade-off is that the sample 
is subject to a number of restrictions. First, 
the sample needs to be restricted to school-
aged children who are currently residing with 
their parents. This is usually accomplished by 
restricting the sample to children aged 5-17 or 
6-17 [see Conley & Glauber (2006) and Li et al. 
(2008), respectively]. In the case of Malaysia, 
children begin schooling at the age of 7, and 
they are not so eager to leave their parents’ home 
once they graduate from high school. Hence, 
the children’s age-range can be expanded to, 
say, 7-20. Doing so reduces our sample size to 
4,760 observations (i.e. a reduction of 7,561 
observations). 
Second, depending on the way the instrument 
for child quantity is defined, the sample needs 
to be restricted further. If gender sameness 
of the first two-born children is chosen as the 
instrument, then the sample needs to be restricted 
to households who have at least three children. 
Doing so decreases our sample size to 4,569 
observations (i.e. a decline of 191 observations). 
Third, given the instrument, too, the unit of 
analysis needs to be confined to the first two-
born children. Doing so results in a huge drop 
in our sample size (i.e. by 3,374 observations), 
leaving us with 1,195 observations [see Black et 
al. (2005) and Conley & Glauber (2006) for the 
second and third sample restrictions].    
Finally, the data for some of the variables of 
interest in this curtailed sample are either not 
available or suspicious. These missing and 
dubious values, in turn, shrink the sample size 
further by 310 observations. Hence, we end up 
with 885 observations. This figure corresponds 
to 430 households, all of whom are characterized 
by dual parents, 311 of whom (or 72%) are 
characterized by dual income earners, and 230 of 
whom (or 53%) are endowed with the first two-
born children of the same gender.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (N = 885)
Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Educ. (years) 0 17 7.66 3.67
Kids (quantity) 3 10 4.34 1.31
Child’s Age (years) 7 20 14.14 3.82
Father’s Age (years) 26 75 42.87 6.33
Mother’s Age (years) 24 62 37.73 5.11
Father’s Educ. (years) 0 18 9.34 3.56
Mother’s Educ. (years) 0 19 9.25 3.25
HHInc (RM) 250 11250 1762.88 1571.45
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Given this substantially reduced sample size, 
the summary statistics of the key variables are 
as follows: Educ (i.e. children’s educational 
attainment) ranges from 0 to 17 years with the 
average of about 7.7 years, Kids (i.e. the number 
of children) ranges from 3 to 10 children with 
the average of about 4 children, age of the 
children ranges from 7 to 20 years with the 
average of about 14 years, 458 of the children 
(or 52%) are males, father’s age ranges from 
26 to 75 years with the average of about 43 
years, mother’s age ranges from 24 to 62 years 
with the average of about 38 years, father’s 
educational attainment ranges from 0 to 18 years 
with the average of about 9 years, and mother’s 
educational attainment ranges from 0 to 19 years 
with the average of about 9 years, and HHInc 
(i.e. household income) ranges from RM250 to 
RM11,250 with the average of about RM1,763 
(see Table 1 for a more detailed summary of the 
tatistics of all of these variables).
Estimation Results
Given the necessary data for a sample of 885 
children in Terengganu, Malaysia, we estimate 
Eq.(1) by the instrumental variable (IV) method, 
where Kids (i.e. child quantity) is instrumented 
by Sameness (i.e. gender sameness of the first 
two-born children), and Eq.(2) by the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method. In other words, 
Eq.(2) serves as the first-stage regression and 
Eq.(1) the second-stage regression.
We begin by running the first-stage regression 
corresponding to Eq. (2) and present the 
estimation results in Table 2. Column (1a) shows 
that the coefficient of Sameness enters with the 
unexpected negative sign but it is significant at 
the 5% level. The negative sign of the coefficient 
carries a counterintuitive implication that 
households with the first two-born children 
of the same gender have a tendency to stop 
reproduction. Nonetheless, since the coefficient 
is statistically significant, we proceed with the 
second-stage regression corresponding to Eq. 
(1) and present the results in Column (1b). We 
observe that the coefficient of Kids enters with 
the unexpected positive sign but it is insignificant 
even at the 10% level. We take these results as 
mild evidence against the theory of the CQQ 
trade-off.
It could be argued that parents behave differently 
with respect to the arrival of the first two-born 
boys than the first two-born girls. If parents 
prefer boys to girls, as argued by some scholars 
[see, for example, Lee (2008)], then they are 
more inclined to consider having another child 
if their first two-born children are girls rather 
than boys. Hence, combining these two cohorts 
of children might undermine or even distort the 
instrument’s impact on child quantity. 
To accommodate this line of reasoning, we 
repeat the analysis with gender sameness of the 
first two-born boys, BB, as the instrument for 
child quantity. As before, we run the first-stage 
regression and report the results in Column (2a). 
We observe that the coefficient of BB enters with 
the unexpected negative sign but it is significant 
at the 1% level. In the second-stage regression, 
as shown in Column (2b), we find that the 
coefficient of Kids enters with the unexpected 
positive sign and is significant at the 10% level. 
We take these results as evidence against the 
theory of CQQ trade-off.
For completeness, we repeat the analysis once 
again with gender sameness of the first two-born 
girls, GG, as the instrument for child quantity. 
The results of the first-stage regression indicate 
that the coefficient of GG enters with the 
unexpected negative sign and is insignificant 
even at the 10% level. (Due to space constraints, 
these results are not tabulated.) The statistical 
insignificance of GG indicates that the variable 
is a weak instrument, thereby precluding us from 
proceeding with the second-stage regression.
It could be argued that low-income households 
are especially concerned about their own 
welfare during their old age. Given their tight 
budget constraints as well as costlier and riskier 
investment in child quality, an investment in 
child quantity appears to be a better means of 
providing these low-income households with a 
social safety net during their old-age period. If 
so, then an increase in household income is more 
likely to induce the low income-households 
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to have more children (instead of educated 
children). This implies that the trade-off between 
Given this argument, a dummy variable 
representing low-income households needs 
to be introduced into our model. Recall from 
Table 1 that the average household income is 
child quantity and child quality is unlikely to be 
applicable to low-income households. 
Table 2
Baseline Estimation Results (N = 885)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Dependent Variable Kids Educ. Kids Educ.
Constant 3.235***
(9.25)
-8.600***
(-3.90)
3.118***
(8.99)
-10.358***
(-5.10)
Kids      - 0.553
(0.81)
- 1.111*
(1.80)
Sameness -0.163**
(-2.07)
- - -
BB - -  -0.301***
(-2.77)
-
Child’s Gender -0.122
(-1.54)
-0.032
(-0.23)
0.037
(0.38)
0.038
(0.24)
Second Child 0.427***
(5.18)
-0.233
(-0.74)
0 .432***
(5.25)
-0.472
(-1.58)
Child’s Age 0.187***
(13.39)
0.741***
(5.74)
0.186***
(13.33)
0.636***
(5.40)
Father’s Age 0.009
(1.00)
0.024*
(1.65)
0.010
(1.09)
0.019
(1.13)
Mother’s Age -0.061***
(-4.97)
0.046
(1.01)
-0.061*
(-4.95)
0.080*
(1.85)
Father’s Educ. 0.026*
(1.92)
0.036
(1.40)
0.026*
(1.96)
0.022
(0.78)
Mother’s Educ. 0.006
(0.43)
0.045**
(2.15)
0.005
(0.37)
0.042*
(1.66)
Adj. R2 0.20 0.80 0.21 0.71
Note: Estimation is done by the IV method; columns (a) and (b) report the results from the first- and second-stage 
regressions, respectively. The figures in parentheses are t-values; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
about RM1,763 per month and the average 
quantity of children in each household is 4.34 
persons, yielding the average household income 
per capita of about RM406 per month. Thus, 
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setting RM400 as the cut-off point between 
low- and high-income households, a dummy 
variable defined as LT400 is introduced for those 
who earn less than RM400 per month on a per 
capita basis. The empirical analysis is repeated 
with the inclusion of this new variable and the 
results are documented in Table 3. In the first-
stage regression, we see that the coefficient of 
Sameness continues to enter with a negative sign 
and is significant at the 10% level [see Column 
(1a)]. Likewise, the coefficient of Kids in the 
second-stage regression continues to enter with a 
positive sign and is insignificant even at the 10% 
level [see Column (1b)].
Table 3
Estimation Results with the Inclusion of LT400 as Another Control Variable (N = 885)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Dependent Variable Kids Educ. Kids Educ.
Constant 2.17***   
(6.19)
-8.352***   
(-4.61)
2.081***   
(5.98)
-9.783*** 
(-5.49)
Kids - 0.628   
(0.76)
- 1.311*   
(1.66)
Sameness -0.137*   
(-1.82)
- - -
BB - - -0.249**   
(-2.40)
-
LT400 0.786***   
(9.53)
-0.361   
(-0.54)
0.781***   
(9.47)
-0.902   
(-1.40)
Child’s Gender -0.092     
(-1.22)
-0.037   
(-0.27)
0.039   
(0.42)
0.028   
(0.17)
Second Child 0.391***
(4.98)
-0.248   
(-0.72)
0.395***   
(5.04)
-0.516   
(-1.50)
Child’s Age 0.173***   
(12.96)
0.733***   
(5.06)
0.172***   
(12.91)
0.615*** 
(4.41)
Father’s Age 0.005   
(0.60)
0.025*   
(1.79)
0.006   
(0.69)
0.022   
(1.25)
Mother’s Age -0.046***   
(-3.94)
0.044   
(1.03)
-0.046***   
(-3.93)
0.075*   
(1.75)
Father’s Educ. 0.044***   
(3.44)
0.026   
(0.62)
0.045***   
(3.46)
-0.005   
(-0.11)
Mother’s Educ. 0.028**   
(1.99)
0.035   
(1.11)
0.027*    
(1.93)
0.016   
(0.45)
Adj. R2 0.28 0.79 0.28 0.67
Note: Estimation is done by the IV method; columns (a) and (b) report the results from the first- and second-stage 
regressions, respectively. The figures in parentheses are t-values; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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As before, we repeat the analysis with BB as 
the instrument for child quantity in lieu of 
Sameness. As shown in Columns (2a) and (2b), 
the coefficients of interest (i.e. those of BB and 
Kids in the first- and second-stage regressions, 
respectively) enter with the same signs and 
significance levels as their counterparts in the 
baseline analysis. Finally, the analysis is repeated 
with GG as the instrument for child quantity. As 
before, we find that the coefficient of GG enters 
with a negative sign and is insignificant. (Due to 
space constraints, these results are not tabulated.) 
Taken together, all of these results suggest 
that conditioning our analysis to low-income 
households does not affect the trade-off (or lack 
of it) between child quantity and child quality.
It could be argued that low-income households 
are not particularly concerned about the gender 
of the first two-born children. In order to provide 
Table 4
Estimation Results with the Inclusion of LT400 as Another Instrument (N = 885)
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Dependent Variable Kids Educ. Kids Educ.
Constant 2.172*** 
(6.19)
-7.446***  
(-11.61)
2.081*** 
(5.98)
-7.607*** 
(-11.87)
Kids - 0.187    
(1.31)
- 0.238*      
(1.68)
Sameness -0.137*   
(-1.82)
- - -
BB - - -0.249**   
(-2.40)
-
LT400 0.786*** 
(9.53)
- 0.781*** 
(9.47)
-
Child’s Gender -0.092     
(-1.22)
-0.078   
(-0.74)
0.039   
(0.42)
-0.072
(-0.67)
Second Child 0.391***
(4.98)
-0.076    
(-0.61)
0.395*** 
(5.04)
-0.098
(-0.78)
Child’s Age 0.173*** 
(12.96)
0.809***  
(24.99)
0.172*** 
(12.91)
0.800*** 
(24.78)
Father’s Age 0.005   
(0.60)
0.027**   
(2.21)
0.006   
(0.69)
0.027**   
(2.17)
Mother’s Age -0.046*** 
(-3.94)
0.023  
 (1.27)
-0.046*** 
(-3.93)
0.026   
(1.43)
Father’s Educ. 0.044*** 
(3.44)
0.046**   
(2.53)
0.045*** 
(3.46)
0.045**   
(2.45)
Mother’s Educ. 0.028**   
(1.99)
0.048**    
(2.47)
0.027*    
(1.93)
0.047**   
(2.44)
Adj. R2 0.28 0.82 0.28 0.82
Note: Estimation is done by the IV method; columns (a) and (b) report the results from the first- and second-stage 
regressions, respectively. The figures in parentheses are t-values; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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with a social safety net during their old age, these 
low-income households might continue to have 
more children regardless of the gender of the first 
two-born children. For non-poor households, 
however, the decision to have more children 
might depend upon the gender of the first two-
born; i.e. they are more likely to add a third child 
if the first two-born are of the same gender. If so, 
then gender sameness is unlikely to be applicable 
to low-income households.
Given this conjecture, the dummy LT400 
qualifies as an additional instrument for child 
quality. The empirical analysis is repeated with 
the inclusion of this additional dummy in the 
first-stage regression and the results are reported 
in Table 4. As shown in Column (1a), the 
coefficient of Sameness enters with a negative 
sign and is significant at the 10% level and the 
coefficient of LT400 enters with a positive sign 
and is significant at the 1% level. Since both 
coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level, 
we proceed with the second-stage regression. As 
before, we observe that the coefficient of Kids 
enters with the unexpected positive sign and is 
insignificant [see Column (1b)].
Repeating the analysis with BB in place of 
Sameness, we see that the coefficient of BB 
enters with a negative sign and is significant at 
the 5% level and the coefficient of LT400 enters 
with a positive sign and is significant at the 
1% level [see Column (2a)]. Again, since both 
coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level, 
we proceed with the second-stage regression: 
now not only that the coefficient of Kids enters 
with the usual positive sign, it is also significant 
at the 10% level [see Column (2b)]. Finally, the 
analysis is repeated with GG in lieu of Sameness. 
As before, the coefficient of GG enters with 
the usual negative sign and is insignificant. 
However, the coefficient of LT400 enters with a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level. 
Since both coefficients are jointly significant at 
the 1% level, we proceed with the second-stage 
regression and find that the coefficient of Kids 
enters with a positive sign albeit insignificant. 
(Again, these results are not tabulated due to 
space constraints.) Here, the evidence is clear-
cut: regardless of which instrument is used, the 
results appear to be at odds with the CQQ trade-
off theory. Overall, our empirical results indicate 
that there is a positive yet insignificant impact 
of child quantity on child quality, suggesting that 
there is mild evidence against the theory of CQQ 
trade-off.
Discussion
The premise of the CQQ trade-off (i.e. households 
behave differently with respect to their mixture 
of child quantity and child quality depending 
on their standards of living) carries a nuisance 
long-run implication. This is the case because if 
the premise holds, then we would expect to see 
a vicious cycle of child quantity-quality divide 
between low- and high-income households. 
To illustrate, consider the first generation of 
households. The poor households tend to produce 
relatively many yet uneducated children who 
will later become the second generation of poor 
households. In contrast, the rich households tend 
to produce relatively few yet educated children 
who will later become the second generation 
of rich households. Now consider the second 
generation of households. Compared to the first 
generation, the second generation of households 
tends to be more diverse in the sense that the 
poor tend to be disproportionately larger than 
the rich. The poor households tend to produce 
relatively many yet uneducated children who 
will later become the third generation of poor 
households. In contrast, the rich households tend 
to produce relatively few yet educated children 
who will later become the third generation of rich 
households. Needless to say, the third generation 
of households tends to be even more diverse in 
that the proportion of the poor outweighs that of 
the rich. For both poor and rich households, the 
cycle continues from one generation to the next, 
resulting in the ever-growing divergence in the 
household’s behaviour between low- and high-
income households within a society. 
If the vicious cycle of child quantity-quality 
divide persists over time, then the economic 
implication is extremely staggering; i.e. there is 
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an inherent tendency towards widening income 
inequality even for a society with a relatively 
balanced income distribution. Are we observing 
this phenomenon in the real world? Perhaps it 
is fair to say that this phenomenon is far from 
universal, and we would argue that this lack of 
universal phenomenon can be attributed to the 
public provision of education. If the government 
provides enough financial support for education, 
then poor households may not choose child 
quantity at the expense of child quality, thereby 
undermining the CQQ trade-off. To illustrate, 
note that human capital is accumulated through 
an investment in education from the primary 
level to the secondary and tertiary levels. Since 
educational investment is costly, and its cost 
increases with the level of education, the poor 
segment of the population is likely to be denied 
access to education, especially at the higher 
levels. In order to compensate this unfortunate 
segment of the society, the governments usually 
intervene by providing free and/or subsidized 
education to the poor. The degree of government 
intervention varies across countries, however. 
According to the Education for All Global 
Monitoring Report released by UNESCO 
(2011), the share of education in the total public 
expenditure in the world ranged from 7% to 27% 
in 2008, with the world average of 14% and that 
of Malaysia stood at 18%.
If the magnitude of the education share of the total 
public expenditure can be taken as an indicator of 
the extent to which the unfortunate segment of the 
population (i.e., the group of poor households) is 
being compensated, then it is possible to assess 
whether a given amount of the public provision 
of education is adequate. Consequently, testing 
the trade-off between child quantity and child 
quality can shed light on the issue of whether 
the public provision of education is adequate. If 
the test yields a result that lends support to the 
theory, then we conclude that there is inadequate 
public provision of education; otherwise, there 
is adequate public provision of education. In 
this paper, we obtain results that appear to be 
inconsistent with the theory. On the basis of 
these results, we conclude that there is adequate 
public provision of education in Malaysia. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we revisit the issue of CQQ 
trade-off in the context of a rural area in a 
developing country, Malaysia. Using a sample 
of 885 children from rural areas in Terengganu, 
Malaysia, we conducted an empirical analysis 
of the relationship between child quantity and 
child quality based on the standard instrumental 
variable method. Our baseline findings indicate 
that the estimated coefficient of child quantity is 
positive but insignificant even at the 10% level. 
It appears that these results are broadly robust to 
the conditioning of our sample on low-income 
households, LT400, either as an additional 
control variable or as an additional instrument. 
Accordingly, we take all of these results as mild 
evidence against the CQQ trade-of theory. Our 
results appear to be consistent with those of 
Black et al. (2005), and Angrist, et al. (2010) but 
inconsistent with Li et al. (2008). Nevertheless, 
we agree with Li et al. (2008)’s argument that 
the trade-off between child quantity and child 
quality depends on the extent of public support 
for education. In the case of Malaysia, primary 
and secondary education is basically provided for 
free, and tertiary education is highly subsidized.
End Notes
1 To illustrate, consider two households, A and B, 
each of whom has the same number of children 
(say, 3) but A’s children are more educated. Then, 
adding another child is more costly for A. In 
other words, the marginal cost of child quantity 
is higher for A.
2 To illustrate, consider two households, M and 
N, each of whom has children of the same level 
of education (say, 13 years of education) but M 
has more children than N. Then, adding another 
year of education is more costly for M. In other 
words, the marginal cost of child quality is higher 
for M.
3 The income elasticity of demand for child quality 
(quantity) refers to the degree of responsiveness 
of the demand for child quality (quantity) with 
respect to a change in household income.
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4 In a subsequent analysis, Becker and Tomes 
(1976) demonstrate that the third proposition can 
be interpreted as a result of the decomposition 
of child quality into two: endowed contribution 
to child quality (i.e. inherited ability) and 
household contribution to child quality (i.e. 
parental investment in child quality). 
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